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Efforts at law and development have failed for decades. The
underlying reasons for the failures have been understood just as long.
Nevertheless, law and development initiatives are proliferating, carrying on
with similarly unsuccessful projects and methods. Academic work on law
and development over the course of this same period has traveled full
circle, ending up where it began, even as the number of scholars engaged
in the subject multiplies, issuing an outpouring of books and articles.
Billions of dollars and the efforts of a multitude of dedicated individuals
have been expended in pursuit of law and development. If the reasons
underlying the persistent failures are not integrated into our
understanding, law and development practitioners and scholars will be
standing in much the same place a generation hence.
The oft-repeated circle can be quickly sketched. Following
decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the initial development effort
centered on economic and political development, with legal development
incorporated as an integral aspect of both. The standard development
formula, then known as "modernization," called for enhancing four
societal features: bureaucratic governmental apparatus, capitalist market
systems, "generalized universalistic legal systems," and democratic political
systems.' At the time, many thought that this combination, as leading
social theorist and proponent Talcott Parsons put it, "confers on its
possessors an adaptive advantage far superior to the structural potential of
T Brian Z. Tamanaha is a Professor of Law at the Washington University in Saint
Louis School of Law. The substance of this article was delivered as the Keynote Address
at the Conference on the Rule of Law, Nagoya University, Japan (June 13, 2009).
1. Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29 AM. Soc. REv. 339, 356
(1964).
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societies lacking it.' 2 By the late 1960s, however, observers acknowledged
that "the failure of this policy is now widely recognized-economic growth
has been exceeded by growth of population, ruinously expensive capital
projects have lost money and brought little benefit except to a few,
corruption and privilege continue to spread among the new elites."'3 Many
explained the disappointing economic progress by pointing to the lack of
"soci[al value systems" essential to the development of capitalism (e.g.,
individualism, work ethic, delayed gratification) and to rapacious or
unstable governments which inhibited economic activities. 4
Malfunctioning political systems, in turn, were similarly blamed on faulty
political cultures, which were defined as "a set of attitudes, beliefs, and
sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which
provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the
political system.' 5 Democracy was slow to take hold, theorists explained,
because the populace and the elites did not share a "political culture" that
values open communication, knowledgeable participation in the political
decision making process, and respect for the public function of
government. 6 By the end of the 1970s, development theory was in disarray
and lacked either a leading model or clear ideas about what could be done
to facilitate economic and political development. 7
Legal development was seen as a concomitant aspect of economic and
political development on the assumption that market regimes and
government require legal backbones.8 The requisite legal regime was
modeled on Western legal systems, requiring uniformity and
comprehensiveness, a monopoly on force, equal application of the law,
rationality, rule-bound decision making, bureaucratic organization, an
emphasis on rights and duties of individuals, and an instrumental view of
law (to serve social needs identified by the polity) with the system run by
2. Id. at 357.
3. J. P. Nettl & Karl von Vorys, The Politics of Development, 46 COMMENTARY 52, 54
(1968).
4. See J. P. Nettl & Roland Robertson, Industrialization, Development or
Modernization, 17 BRIT. J. Soc. 274, 278 (1966). See generally POLITICAL CULTURE AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Lucian W. Pye & Sidney Verba eds., 1965). But see generally
Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAw &
Soc. REV. 723 (1980) (describing the dependency theory, which blames economic
failure on the global economic system which favors the West at the Third World's
expense).
5. Lucian W. Pye, Political Culture, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 218, 218 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
6. GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES
AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 13-15 (1963). See generally Gabriel A. Almond, A
Developmental Approach to Political Systems, 17 WORLD POL. 183 (1965).
7. See Harry Eckstein, The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency,
in POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CHANGE 311 (Ikuo Kabashima & Lynn T. White, III eds., 1986);
see also Tony Smith, Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies, in POLITICAL SYSTEM
AND CHANGE 347 (Ikuo Kabashima & Lynn T. White, Ill eds., 1986).
8. See Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 52-53(1969) (describing these assumptions and then raising doubts).
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legal professionals. 9 The "received wisdom of law and development" at the
time held that "a more highly developed legal system leads to a more highly
developed economy or polity." 10 Additionally, lawyers touted law as
uniquely suited for facilitating the development project because "[a]
primary function of law may be to engineer the social and economic
change necessary to achieve the goals of development."" By this account,
law would provide the legal infrastructure required for development, and
law had the capacity to bring about the social, economic, and political
changes (including requisite cultural attitudes) conducive to
development. 12
Law and development initiatives mainly took the form of transplanting
Western legal institutions and codes into developing countries, and
working to establish legal education and professional organizations based
on Western models. These initiatives were quickly seen as a failure.
13
Elites would co-opt the law or undermine legal reforms that threatened to
dilute their power, corruption was endemic among legal officials, legal
institutions were dysfunctional, and legal codes amounted to little more
than words on paper 14 . Parallel to prevailing accounts of disappointing
economic and political development, a leading explanation in the legal
context pointed to the lack of a supportive "legal culture"-"habits of
obedience to law, and respect for law."'1 5 An early participant in law and
development formulated "the law of non-transferability of law."'1 6 "A
particular law in two places with different social, political, economic and
other circumstances can . . . only by coincidence induce similar behavior
in both places."17
All of the above was noted in the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting broad
recognition that efforts at building or reproducing capitalism, democracy,
and liberal legal systems had met with little success. Meanwhile, against
the grain of this broad pessimism, extraordinary economic and political
changes have taken place in many countries since the 1960s. Immense
economic strides were made in a few decades by the Asian tigers (Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), then later by China and India,
9. See generally Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION,
(Myron Weiner ed., 1966).
10. Friedman, supra note 8, at 58.
11. Robert A. Sedler, Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-Saharan Africa:
Social Change and the Development of the Modern Legal System, 13 ST. Louis U. LJ. 195,
199 (1968).
12. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L.
REV. 1062 (1974).
13. See id.
14. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & Soc.
REV. 29 (1969); Robert B. Seidman, Law and Development: A General Model, 6 LAW &
Soc. REV. 311, 328 (1972).
15. Friedman, supra note 8, at 61; see also Friedman, supra note 14, at 29.
16. ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT 34 (1978).
17. Id. at 35-36.
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among others.18 A wave of democratization around the world began in the
mid-1970s-ironically, not long after political scientists explained that
many countries lacked the civic culture essential to democracy. 19 Only 41
of 150 existing states in the world were democratic in 1974; now three-
fifths of nation-states are democratic. 20 The late twentieth century ushered
in a "global diffusion of markets and democracy." 2 1
These successes, however, have been tempered by a broader sense that
things have generally not gone well.22 One billion people remain mired in
abject poverty, with another billion perched just above them on the
economic scale. 23 Much of Africa and large parts of Central Asia have
stagnated, or gone backwards, and progress in Latin American has been
uneven and halting. 24 The crisis of the late 1990s exposed the fragility of
the booming Asian economies, while the Western-encouraged swift
transition of post-communist countries to privatization and unfettered
market capitalism produced poor results. The picture for democracy is
also mixed, with a substantial group of countries-including powers like
China and Russia-showing little movement toward democratization.25
Furthermore, several newly minted democracies appear precarious; some
are illiberal or controlled by blocks within society, 26 while several others
continue to suffer from significant "violations of human rights, massive
corruption, and a weak rule of law."27
Contemporary specialists in economic and political development
acknowledge the enormity of the hurdles. The collapse of the once-
confident "Washington Consensus" and the financial crisis in Western
economies that unfolded in 2007-08 have shaken the confidence of
economic theorists. Development economists admit that they have no
reliable knowledge about how to generate economic development. 28
Successful projects in one context do not necessarily work in another.
Recent writing on economic and political development has once again
18. Iqbal Z. Quadir, Yes. China and India are Already Making Rapid Strides, WHAT
MATrERS, July 2009, http://whatmatters.mckinseydigital.com/the-debate zone/will-
asia-become-the-centerofor-innovation-in-the-2 lst-century?pg=7#ab.
19. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Development and Political Decay, 17 WORLD
POL. 386 (1965).
20. Larry Diamond, Universal Democracy?, POL'Y REv., June 2003, at 3-25, available
at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/8078.
21. THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY (Beth A. Simmons, Frank
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008).
22. See WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO
AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD (2006); see generally JEFFRY A.
FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006).
23. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 3-5 (2007).
24. See id.
25. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 91 (2003).
26. See id. at 17-21.
27. See generally Diamond, supra note 20.
28. See Jessica Cohen & William Easterly, Introduction: Thinking Big Versus Thinking
Small, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL (Jessica
Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009).
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arrived at the position that "culture matters. ' 2 9 According to a prominent
development economist, "[i]f we learn anything from the history of
economic development, it is that culture makes almost all the difference."
30
Economic development thrives in cultures that value "thrift, investment,
hard work, education, organization, and discipline." 3 1 Contemporary
political scientists likewise conclude that societies without an ethos of
broad participation and deliberation-especially those with culturally
established inequalities, hierarchy, and rigid obedience to authority-
suffer from stunted democracy or no democracy.
3 2
Contemporary law and development is in a similar funk and has taken
the same turn. As Part I will elaborate, "a strong current of dis-
appointment" runs through the law and development literature.3 3 The
standard "rule of law and development" formula involves drafting legal
codes; training legal officials (police, prosecutors, and judges); solidifying
law schools and the legal profession; and enhancing legal access for
citizens.3 4 These legal reforms have not taken hold. Corruption and
dysfunction continues to plague legal institutions, many transplanted codes
lie unused, and substantial proportions of the populace are not served by
the legal system. People engaged in law and development projects admit
that they do not have a good idea of what works; they also recognize that
success in one context does not necessarily mean success in another.
Lately, practitioners and scholars have begun to emphasize the lack of an
appropriate legal culture: "The rule of law is not something that exists
'beyond culture' and that can be somehow added to an existing culture by
the simple expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting
constitutions and statutes. 35 In its substantive sense, the rule of law is a
culture[.]" 36 The solution, they assert, is to implement programs that
inculcate values in the citizenry supportive of the rule of law-mainly,
respect for the law.3 7
29. CULTURE MATTERS: How HUMAN VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E.
Harrison & Samuel P. Harrington eds., 2000).
30. David Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS: How
HUMAN VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 2 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P.
Harrington eds., 2000).
31. Samuel P. Huntington, Cultures Count, in CULTURE MATTERS: How HUMAN VALUES
SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS xiii (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Harrington eds., 2000).
32. See Fernando Calder6n & Alicia Szmukler, Political Culture and Development, in
CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 281 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 2004); Anita
Abraham & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Participatory Development: Where Culture Creeps In,
in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 210 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 2004).
33. Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries Through the New
Law and Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually
Disappointing Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 384 (2002).
34. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 168
(1999).
35. See Amy J. Cohen, Thinking With Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 511 (2009) (describing and raising questions about the recent turn to culture).
36. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of
Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2285 (2003).
37. See generally Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L. L. 357 (2007).
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Thus, we have come full circle. The diagnosis is correct-though
incomplete-that cultural attitudes toward law are important. To propose
that the solution is to target reform efforts at culture, however, is more of
the same refusal to learn. Such efforts will not work as intended. The
problems are not just that culture is a fuzzy, all-encompassing notion, or
that we have no idea how to mold culture to our desires, or that culture
changes incrementally, or even that the very project-deliberately
inculcating values in other societies-has imperialistic overtones. The
bigger problem is that a causal arrow does not run singly from culture to
institutions. Culture and institutions (as recognized decades ago)3 8 are
mutually constitutive: to operate effectively, legal systems require respect
and support from the populace, but to secure this respect and support, the
legal system must serve the needs of the populace. Neither side of this
relation exists without the other-and the answer to this chicken and egg
problem is that both come first, or at the same time, growing together.
This conundrum, although tough, is not the main reason why
targeting cultural attitudes about law will not solve law and development
failures. The more fundamental problem is that factors that influence law
extend far beyond law itself. Legal institutions and cultural attitudes
toward law exist inseparably within a broader milieu that includes the
history, tradition, and culture of a society; its political and economic
system; the distribution of wealth and power; the degree of
industrialization; the ethnic, language, and religious make-up of the society
(the presence of group tension); the level of education of the populace; the
extent of urbanization; and the geo-political surroundings (hostile or
unstable neighbors)-everything about a particular society matters. Power
dynamics among the elite within a society are particularly influential in
shaping the operation of law,3 9 which, in turn, affects how the populace
regards the law. For convenience, I call this the "connectedness of law
principle," to convey that the law is connected to every aspect of society.
Reforms targeted at law will unavoidably impinge upon, and be affected
by, the enveloping fabric of society, frequently in unanticipated ways. The
theoretical ambition of this Article, independent of law and development, is
to expose aspects of the relationship between law and society that are
usually hidden from view.
A crucial revelation lies in the parallel fates of the economic, political,
and legal development efforts described above-each breaks apart on the
shoals of societies that do not possess the same cultural underpinnings,
institutional alignments, and power dynamics. These respective
development programs-capitalism, democracy, liberal legalism-are
extracted from institutional arrangements that co-evolved in an integrated
38. See John Street, Review Article: Political Culture- From Civic Culture to Mass
Culture, 24 BRIT.J. POL. ScI. 95, 97-102 (1994) (describing this realization in the 1960s).
39. The overarching influence of elite dynamics on the development of the legal
order is the central theme of DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN J. WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST,
VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED
HuMA HISTORY (2009).
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fashion within Western societies. Because the avowed objective in the
1960s and 1970s was to transform developing countries to fit the Western
model, modernization theory readily acknowledged this: "[Tihe typical
condition of modernity pertains to the social, political and economic
characteristics of Western liberal democracies." 40 After modernization
theory was excoriated for being ethnocentric, as well as conceptually and
empirically unsound, this theory was driven underground.4 1 Since then,
by all accounts, the theory has remained safely interred in the graveyard of
discredited ideas.4 2
However, there is little discernable difference between those
supposedly abandoned ideas, and contemporary ideas and approaches to
development. What helps disguise this resurrection is that the elements
are not bundled together as tightly as before-capitalism is now promoted
separately as essential to wealth creation; democracy is championed as the
touchstone of a free and peaceful society; the rule of law is said to be
essential for economic development and limiting government tyranny; and
human rights are claimed to be universal.43 When seen together, however,
there is no mistaking it-this is modernization theory redux. This includes
its attendant assumptions (now implicitly maintained) that this collective
political, economic, and legal arrangement is the best available and
represents the future trajectory of societies around the world, at least for
societies that hope to thrive. Reality on the ground belied modernization
theory decades ago. The same realities are revealed again today for the
plain reason that economic, political, and legal institutional arrangements
taken from one society do not work the same way in another society with
different arrangements and underpinnings.
The prospects are worse for law and development than for other
elements of the modernization package. The past thirty years have
demonstrated that components of capitalism (introducing market
mechanisms, securing financing, establishing factories and production
chains) and democracy (instituting periodic elections) can be implemented
through the creation of new institutional arrangements that function
effectively-although they will not work the same or have the same
consequences as in the West. Legal institutions, however, are relatively
more dependent upon and subject to history and surrounding social
forces.
Recent geo-political events have moved law and development from the
margins to center stage. President Barack Obama's "2010 State of the
Union Address" linked the fight against terrorism and the war in
Afghanistan to the success of law and development initiatives:
40. Nettl & Robertson, supra note 4, at 281.
41. See Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of "Law and Development," 1982 Wis. L. REV.
373, 373 (1982) (reviewing JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAwYERS
AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980))
42. See id. at 373-74.
43. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?: Problems and
Prospects of US-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China
5-12 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. for Int'l. Dev., Working Paper No. 47, 2000).
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And in Afghanistan, we're increasing our troops and training Afghan
security forces so they can begin to take the lead in July of 2011, and our
troops can begin to come home. We will reward good governance, work to
reduce corruption, and support the rights of all Afghans-men and women
alike.44
For the reasons laid out in this Article, if this is indeed the U.S. strategy, it
is unwise. It cannot succeed in the short term and it is highly unlikely to
succeed in the long term.
This is not a counsel of despair. Underneath the gloomy pessimism
that pervades law and development, legal development is taking place. A
central theme of this Article is that it is crucial to mark the distinction
between "law and development" activities-the modernization project-and
"legal development"-the ongoing construction of legal institutions that
occurs in all societies. It is easy to conflate the two because they sound the
same, but they are not. The failure of law and development efforts does not
mean that legal development is not taking place. It means that the projects
are not working and it tells us that imprudent application of the standard
law and development template is a mistake. A better way forward is to
think about how legal development usually takes place-that is, finding
viable solutions in particular contexts to pressing economic, political, and
social problems.
The argument will proceed in successive layers designed to gradually
draw out both why and how "law and development" is different from "legal
development." Part I describes the current state of law and development.
Part II explains why it is misleading to see law and development as a
"field." Part III shows how the connectedness of law undermines legal
reform efforts. Parts IV and V examine the two main streams of contempo-
rary law and development, what I call, respectively, "law and capitalism"
and the "progressive development package." Part VI elaborates on how law
and development projects are designed and carried out by lawyers in a
fashion that invites failure because they ignore the connectedness of law.
Part VII shows how the ideas that inform the two streams of law and devel-
opment harbor potentially harmful unanticipated consequences when
transplanted into societies with different underpinnings. Part VIII illus-
trates the point that law and development is not the same as legal develop-
ment. Part IX concludes the Article by suggesting a better way to think
about these projects going forward.
1. The Current State of Law and Development
Law and development efforts have now spanned more than half a cen-
tury. The labels have changed over time: in the fifties, sixties, and seventies
it was called the "law and development movement";4 5 in the eighties and
44. Barack H. Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010) (available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/27/state-of-the-union-
2010-full-text-transcript.n 439459.html).
45. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 12.
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nineties, through the turn of the century, it morphed from "good govern-
ance programs" to "rule of law and development. '46 In the first few
decades, modest financial support was supplied by a few aid agencies and
foundations; in the nineties, the funding spigot burst open, with financial
support coming from a multitude of organizations that cumulatively
amounted to several billion dollars.4 7
This effort has involved an untold number of projects around the
world, focusing on enhancing legal education; implementing judicial
reform; constitution or code drafting; transplanting laws and institutions;
law enforcement training; combating corruption; educating lay people
about the law; providing access to the law for the poor; and supplying
material assistance for legal institution building (including basics like
office supplies, computers, and legal materials). There are innumerable
project reports, local studies, national or transnational studies, and com-
parative studies, running the gamut from project assessments, to historical
accounts, to statistical studies, to broad overviews.
Law and development work is funded or carried out by major interna-
tional and national institutions, both public and private, which promi-
nently include the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, the American Bar Association, the UN
Development Program (UNDP), the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the United Kingdom's Department
for International Development, the Asian Development Bank, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency, and many more.48
What are the fruits of this lengthy and costly effort? There are two
distinct aspects to this question. The first aspect looks at how much law
and development has accomplished on the ground. The second aspect
focuses on the body of knowledge accumulated about what works in law
and development.
An honest evaluation compels an unhappy conclusion on both
aspects. By most accounts, the actual improvements in law realized from
these efforts have been meager. Thomas Carothers, director of the rule of
law project for the Carnegie Foundation, offers this assessment:
The effects of this burgeoning rule-of-law aid are generally positive,
though usually modest. After more than ten years and hundreds of millions
of dollars of aid, many judicial systems in Latin America still function
poorly. Russia is probably the single largest recipient of such aid, but is not
even clearly moving in the right direction. The numerous rule-of-law pro-
grams carried out in Cambodia after the 1993 elections failed to create val-
ues or structures strong enough to prevent last year's coup. Aid providers
46. See Stephenson, supra note 43.
47. See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 253 (David. M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (pegging the World Bank's contribution alone at $3.8 billion).
48. See, e.g., About Us, THE FORD FOUNDATION, http://www.fordfoundation.org/
about-us/programs (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
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have helped rewrite laws around the globe, but they have discovered that the
mere enactment of laws accomplishes little without considerable investment
in changing the conditions for implementation and enforcement....
Efforts to strengthen basic legal institutions have proven slow and diffi-
cult. Training for judges, technical consultancies, and other transfers of
expert knowledge make sense on paper but often have only minor impact.
4 9
Matters are worse than this passage lets on, unfortunately, because
Carothers omits the most disheartening failure.5 0 During the same period,
in excess of one hundred million dollars was spent in Africa on law and
development, with results that have been characterized as "pretty
depressing.
' 5 1
Carothers also offers a bracing assessment of the current state of
knowledge. A long-time participant confided in him that "'we know how
to do a lot of things, but deep down we don't really know what we are
doing."' 5 2 Work in this field operates
from a disturbingly thin base of knowledge at every level-with respect
to the core rationale of the work, the question of where the essence of the
rule of law actually resides in different societies, how change in the rule of
law occurs, and what the real effects are of changes that are produced. The
lessons learned to date have for the most part not been impressive and often
do not actually seem to be learned.5 3
Carothers' discouraging estimation of the fruits of law and develop-
ment efforts appears to be widely shared among those who engage in this
work. A review of three recent notable books on law and development
observed:
Although the contributions to these volumes reflect decades of both
practical experience with and scholarly reflection upon legal reforms in
developing countries, at the end of the day they are remarkably inconclusive.
None of the authors represented in these volumes seem strongly optimistic
about whether legal reforms are likely to promote development (at least
early in the development trajectory).54
The most an optimist can say is that it is premature to draw overly
pessimistic conclusions. 55 It "will take many years or even decades before
it becomes clear whether and to what extent sustained impact
49. Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 11-12 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
50. A catalogue of the widespread and persistent failures is Stephen Golub, A House
Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE
105 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
51. Laure-Helne Piron, Time to Learn, Time to Act in Africa, in PROMOTING THE RULE
OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 275, 289 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
52. Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 15, 15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
53. Id. at 27.
54. Kevin E. Davis & MichaelJ. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Devel-
opment: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMp. L. 895, 897 (2008).
55. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 470, 473, 484 (1995).
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transpires." 5 6
One clear lesson shines through the haze: society is the all-consuming
center of gravity of law and development. The term "society" is used here
in a capacious sense-encompassing the totality of history, culture, human
and material resources, religious and ethnic composition, demographics,
knowledge, economic conditions, and politics. No aspect of law or devel-
opment operates in or can be understood in isolation from these surround-
ing factors. The qualities, character, and consequences of law are
thoroughly and inescapably influenced by the surrounding society. There
can be no standard formula for law because every legal context in every
society involves a unique constellation of forces and factors. A good law in
one location may have ill effects or be dysfunctional elsewhere.
Law and development practitioners and scholars recognize this funda-
mental truth. "Context matters," "local conditions are crucial," "circum-
stances on the ground shape how things work"-this insight has been
repeated so often it is nearly a clich&.5 7 What stymies law and develop-
ment projects time and again is the "the extreme interrelatedness of every-
thing with everything else in a society."5 8 This is the connectedness of law
principle. 59 The proposition that law is interconnected with everything in
society applies with full force to all legal systems. This is the fundamental
insight of law and society research.60 Two and a half centuries ago, Mon-
tesquieu observed that law is so intimately tied to society that "it is very
unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another."'6 1 Elaborating upon
Montesquieu's view, the pioneering legal sociologist Eugen Ehrlich
remarked in 1916 that "law is a component of social life along with the
other 'things governing men' and that each of them determines the
others . . . . [Tihe interdependence of all the elements of social life is
assumed."'6 2
Because it is impossible to know or consider everything, one might be
tempted to give up in despair. Law and development practitioners have
plowed ahead anyway, using general templates on transplanting legal
codes, bolstering courts, training lawyers, and hoping for the best.
56. Golub, supra note 50, at 125.
57. An article that focuses on the failure to recognize this insight is Cynthia Alkon,
The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under Post-Communist Democratiza-
tion Programs, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 327 (2002); see also Stephen J. Troope, Legal and
Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some Lessons, 48 McGILL LJ. 357,
387-390 (2003).
58. David M. Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices, and Development Com-
mon Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 153 (David. M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (Kenned)' uses this phrase in connection with policy making,
but it perfectly fits law as well).
59. An outline of the thick social milieu which law operates in can be found in BRIAN
Z. TAMANA-A, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 213-221 (2001).
60. See Friedman, supra note 8.
61. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1748).
62. Eugen Ehrlich, Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 582,
586 (1916).
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II. Why "Law and Development" is Better Not Seen as a Field
Many who write on law and development appear to consider it a
"field." "With a recognizable set of activities that make up the rule-of-law
assistance domain," Carothers writes, "rule-of-law assistance has taken on
the character of a coherent field of aid."6 3 Conceiving of law and develop-
ment as a field, I will argue, is a conceptual mistake that perpetuates confu-
sion. The multitude of countries around the world targeted for law and
development projects differ radically from one another. No uniquely unify-
ing basis exists upon which to construct a "field"; there is no way to draw
conceptual boundaries to delimit it. Law and development work is more
aptly described as an agglomeration of projects advanced by motivated
actors and supported by external funding. Law and development activities
are driven and shaped by the flow of money that supports it and by the
agendas of the people who secure this funding.64 This is offered as an
accurate description, not a cynical characterization. A quick glance at a
few countries in which law and development projects are being done will
help make the point.
Russia is an industrialized country run by a semi-authoritarian polity,
with a formidable military, struggling to make the transition from decades
of communism to global capitalism. Russia's economy collapsed after the
transition and has grown unevenly since.6 5 It enjoys ample natural
resources, including significant natural gas reserves. It has a well-educated
populace, a cadre of ultra-rich, a notable organized crime presence, and a
police force plagued by corruption. 66 It covers a huge territorial expanse
reaching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific, encompassing large sub-popu-
lations of ethnic groups with different religions, cultures, and languages. 6 7
Pakistan is a populous Islamic nation in the mountainous region of
Central Asia, with teeming modern cities bustling with economic activity,
as well as vast rural stretches where people live in conditions hardly differ-
ent from those of centuries past.6 8 The military is independent from the
executive branch of government and has a strong presence in the manage-
ment of domestic affairs. Since separating from India as an Islamic nation
in 1956, the reins of government have shifted back and forth between dem-
ocratic elections and military coups. In recent years, Pakistan's manufac-
turing for export and service sectors has grown at an enviable pace,
63. Carothers, supra note 52, at 28.
64. Id.
65. For an overview of Russia's economic situation see EASTERLY, supra note 22, at
61-75.
66. Theodore P. Gerber & Sarah E. Mendelson, Public Experiences of Police Violence
and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing?, 42 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 1, 12, 16-18 (2008); Ethan S. Burger, Corruption in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts:
Will There Be Significant Progress in the Near Term?, 38 INT'L LAW. 15, 19 (2004).
67. See generally DAVID C. LEWIS, AFTER ATHEISM: RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA
AND CENTRAL ASIA (2000).
68. See Talat Anwar, Sarfraz K. Qureshi & Hammad Ali, Landlessness and Rural Pov-
erty in Pakistan, 43 PAK. DEV. REv. 855 (2004).
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although with intermittent severe setbacks.6 9 The legal profession and
courts are well established in the cities, but state courts in rural areas are
negligible, corrupt, suffer long delays, and there are few lawyers to serve
the rural population. The Taliban controls certain regions of the country
outside the cities, where they impose a harsh brand of Sharia law.
70
Many nations in sub-Saharan Africa have weak or failed states; little
industrial development or manufacturing; unreliable electrification; an
inadequate infrastructure of communication, transportation, and sewer-
age; miserable education systems; and poor public heath (including a dev-
astating AIDS epidemic). A substantial proportion of the population lives
in impoverished agricultural regions. Government jobs are the main
source of employment. Many African countries have relatively few trained
lawyers and judges. For example, with a population of 7.5 million, Rwanda
is served by about fifty lawyers, twenty prosecutors, and fifty newly
recruited judges.7 1 Malawi has 300 lawyers for 9 million people. 72 African
nations, many with relatively small populations (under 20 million), inher-
ited a colonial legacy that combines an uneasy mix of rival tribal or ethnic
groups, along with descendants of white settlers and other immigrants.
Tension among groups occasionally erupts into violence, as in the case of
Rwanda in the mid-1990s, where violence occurred on a horrific scale
between the Tutsis and Hutus. 73 African countries have been plagued by
recurrent civil wars and coups that reflect underlying tribal or ethnic rival-
ries. Several countries have rich reserves of natural resources controlled by
government heads or by oligarchic firms with close ties to the govern-
ment.74 Autocratic rule is common, with rulers dedicated to maintaining
power, siphoning off wealth, and rewarding supporters.
Russia, Pakistan, and Rwanda have certain aspects in common-if
observed from a mile-high vantage point that renders all details invisible.
But what do Russia, Pakistan, and Rwanda have in common with Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, Malawi, Morocco, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Romania? All of
these countries are addressed in some detail in Carothers' book on the rule
of law and development. 7 5 Also mentioned in the book are Bangladesh,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, Romania, South Africa, Vene-
zuela, and Vietnam, and the list goes on. These countries differ from one
another in virtually every respect: population, natural resources, history,
69. See Real GDP, FED. BUREAU OF STAT., http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/GDPtable.
pdf.
70. See Pamela Constable, Taliban-Style Justice Stirs Growing Anger, WASH. POST (May
10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/O5/ 0 9 /AR
2009050902518.html.
71. Piron, supra note 51, at 282.
72. Id. at 291.
73. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, transmitted by letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the Secre-
tary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, '1 1, U.N. Doc. S/1999/
1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
74. EASTERLY, supra note 22, at 125-26.
75. See CAROTHERS, supra note 52.
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culture, mix of religions and ethnic groups, political system, degree of
industrialization, agricultural production, competitive position in global
trade, extent of urbanization, per capital income, proportion of middle
class, number of lawyers, compensation and status of judges-to name a
few. The only obvious trait these varied countries share is that they have
been on the receiving end of law and development projects or research.
No advanced capitalist country-Anglo-America, Western Europe,
Japan, and more recently Korea and Taiwan-is on the law and develop-
ment list. Eligibility for law and development is defined in negative terms:
any country not admitted to the advanced capitalist club is a candidate.
This solely negative criterion deprives "law and development" countries of
shared qualities upon which to build insights. The connectedness of law in
society exacerbates this lack of a common core by making it hazardous to
extrapolate experiences from one situation to the next. The success or fail-
ure of a judicial reform project in Russia will have little bearing on the
same project in Rwanda or the isolated hills and valleys of Pakistan.
I1. How the Connectedness of Law Bedevils Judicial Reform Efforts
Because judicial institutions occupy a pivotal position in legal systems,
corrupt or dysfunctional courts can debilitate the entire legal system. Lack-
ing force of arms and unable to fund their own operations, courts usually
are weak by comparison to other governmental institutions, particularly in
developmental contexts. 76 For these reasons, and because judicial training
is a relatively easy exercise, judicial reform is a favorite target of law and
development efforts. A closer look at the reasons underlying the failures of
these efforts helps illustrate the broader lack of success in legal reforms.
Reform does not work if it focuses solely on courts in isolation. A
group of legal practitioners is needed to handle criminal and civil cases
and to help develop legal practices and shared legal knowledge. Legal
material must be available to legal officials. Clerks and transcribers are
necessary to process and record proceedings. Judicial compensation must
be set at levels sufficient to attract qualified individuals and to lessen the
temptation to supplement pay through corruption. Judges must resist the
influence of prejudices, class or group loyalties, the calls of friendship or
extended networks of relations, and other improper incentives. Judges
must have job security and personal security. They must not be subject to
intimidation or threats from warlords, drug lords, organized crime, ter-
rorists, or other dangerous elements, including other government officials.
Political leaders, military leaders, the economic elite, the police, and gov-
ernment officials must generally abide by judicial rulings, including rul-
ings that go against their interests or frustrate their desired objectives. The
public must generally comply with judicial rulings and judicial orders
76. See, e.g., Steven L. Taylor, Democratization in Latin America, 37 LATIN Am. REs.
REV. 162, 172 (2002) (describing a consensus that judiciaries are the weakest pillars of
Latin American democracies).
Vol. 44
2011 Failures of Law and Development
must be backed by effective sanctions when compliance is not
forthcoming.
This basic list of the conditions necessary for a functioning state judi-
cial system exposes the daunting scope of the task. Each aspect is contin-
gent upon other factors that reach into realms beyond law itself. No single
piece works in isolation. The idealized model of well functioning legal
institutions assumes that a host of (invisible) secondary supportive condi-
tions are also in place, involving a confluence of social, economic, cultural,
and political factors.
An essential component of the rule of law is a prevailing ethic of volun-
tary compliance with the law and with legal rulings by judges among gov-
ernment officials and citizens. Respect for law and judges, however, will
not take hold among citizens when judges are distrusted or avoided; per-
ceived as corrupt; identified with the elite; seen as puppets of the regime;
believed to favor one group at the expense of others; or when the populace
is alienated from the law because it is stained by a colonial or authoritarian
past or present or is written in a language they do not understand or was
transplanted from elsewhere and is considered obscure or alien. Respect
for law will also lag when judges are seen as simply inept or the judicial
system is prohibitively expensive or suffers from long delays or other ineffi-
ciencies. One or more of these conditions are commonly found in develop-
ing countries.
When several of these conditions prevail, state courts end up ineffec-
tive, marginalized, and ignored, feared or despised by citizens. A promi-
nent political scientist who has studied the region for decades observed,
"Across most of Latin America, the judiciary is too distant, cumbersome,
expensive, and slow for the poor and vulnerable even to attempt to access
it. And if they do manage to obtain judicial access, the available evidence
often points to severe and systematic discrimination. '' 77 Reforms in Brazil
were implemented to grant judges substantial independence, including pro-
tections against removal, guaranteed salaries, control over staffing, disci-
pline, and their budget. Observers found that the "sweeping increases in
the autonomy of the judiciary led to rampant nepotism and other opportu-
nities for corruption. '78 The judiciary came to be seen as a "privileged
enclave," widely scorned by the public.79 In parts of Eastern Europe
judges have exploited institutional protections of judicial independence to
shelter incompetence and corruption. 80 Judges in a number of countries
across East Asia are perceived as biased (partial to the state) or corrupt. In
77. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 32,
40-41 (2004).
78. Michael Dodson, Assessing Judicial Reform in Latin America, 37 LATIN Am. RES.
REv. 200, 215 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Venelin I. Ganev, The Rule of Law as an Institutional Wager: Constitutions, Courts
and Transformative Social Dynamics in Eastern Europe, 1 HAGUE J. RULE L. 263, 272-73
(2009).
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Indonesia, where polls show low levels of respect for courts,8 1 people take
the majority of their disputes to informal community mechanisms or relig-
ious leaders.8 2 Similarly, more "than 80 to 90 percent of day-to-day dis-
putes in Africa are said to be resolved through nonstate systems such as
traditional authorities .... -83 The UK Department for International Devel-
opment estimates that "in many developing countries traditional or cus-
tomary legal systems account for 80% of total cases."8 4 That might well be
a low estimate. 85 Citizens are less likely to resort to state legal systems
when they do not identify with the norms or orientation of the legal sys-
tem; or are deterred by expense, distance, inefficiency, or corruption.
Traditional or customary fora typically draw upon local rather than state
law norms to resolve disputes and often strive to reach consensual
outcomes.
8 6
A study of failed judicial reform efforts across Latin America con-
cluded, "[i]n sum, good judging can only be expected when all elements of
the justice system are reformed, when civil society actively supports
reform, and when the political culture places a high value on a reformed
judiciary."'8 7 Legal institutions require social stability, sufficient economic
resources, favorable cultural attitudes toward law, and political stability.
These factors cluster together in a mutually supportive fashion in well-
functioning situations-although each combination is unique and an infi-
nite variety of possible combinations can function positively. The absence
of a supportive cluster magnifies the difficulty of the task, since it is enor-
mously difficult to bring the full complement of supportive strands on line.
This is the connectedness of law principle in action. The tenacious para-
dox mentioned at the beginning of this article constitutes a kind of struc-
tural trap that bedevils reform efforts. Dysfunctional, oppressive, or unfair
legal systems breed popular distrust and contempt for the law. This, in
turn, contributes to the incapacity of the legal system, which further gener-
ates fear, avoidance, or disregard of the law. The trap can be avoided if
courts consistently function over time in ways that meet the needs of citi-
zens, but negative cultural attitudes toward law and judges are slow to
change.
Although the focus of this discussion is on judicial reforms, the same
points apply to all kinds of legal reform. Consider this summary of the
failed reform of economic laws following the collapse of communism: "[i]n
81. See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land Law,
22 YALEJ. INT'L L. 171, 204 (1997). For a superb account of systemic judicial corruption
in Indonesia, see SEBASTIAAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT: A STUDY OF INSTITU-
TIONAL COLLAPSE (2005).
82. See MARIA DAKOLIAS, METHODS FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATING THE RULE OF LAW
22 (2005), available at http://www.cilc.nl/Conference-publication_2005.pdf.
83. Piron, supra note 51, at 291.
84. Golub, supra note 50, at 118.
85. An estimate offered by one World Bank unit is 90%. See World Bank Indon. Soc.
Dev. Unit, Forging the Middle Ground: Engaging Non-State Justice in Indonesia 3 (May
2008).
86. See T IANAHA, supra note 59, at 112-120.
87. Dodson, supra note 78, at 202 (2002).
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Eastern Europe, chief recipients of foreign aid were the Big Six accounting
firms in the West, who drafted new laws for Eastern Europe and trained
thousands of locals in Western law. Eastern European legislatures passed
the Western-drafted laws, satisfying aid conditions for the West, but the
new laws on paper had little effect on actual rules of conduct."88 Legal
reforms of this sort-particularly wholesale legal transplantation-fail
because they are not adapted to prevailing legal and economic circum-
stances and cultures, they are grafted onto legal systems that suffer from a
host of systemic problems, or they lack sufficient resources and local stake-
holders committed to the success of the law.8 9
Again, this is not a fatalistic view. Legal development has occurred by
a variety of different pathways, from organic growth to imposed or volun-
tary transplantation. Furthermore, there is no single or standard arrange-
ment for a functioning legal system that meets the needs of its citizenry.
"The one 'precondition' that seems to exist in almost all cases is indigenous
demand for legal and judicial reform, be it driven by an elite (the common
pattern) or by broad popular sentiment." 90 Certain parts of the system can
function while others fail. Constitutional courts across Eastern Europe, for
example, have successfully established constitutional limits on government
that are respected by political actors, while at the same time, lower courts
in these same countries are gripped by pervasive corruption.9 1
IV. Law and Capitalism
The main stream of law and development in the past two decades has
been justified in terms of economic development. The bulk of the funding
for law and development activities is provided by institutions, like the
World Bank, whose primary mission is to advance economic develop-
ment.92 The development of law is promoted as a means to achieve the
economic development end. The standard package includes laws on incor-
poration, securities, antitrust, banking, intellectual property, commercial
transactions, protections for foreign investors, as well as property rights
and contract enforcement. These concepts constitute the "Washington
Consensus" plank of market-friendly reforms actively pushed throughout
the world in the 1980s and 1990s.
93
Several contributing factors fueled the emphasis on the adoption of
law for economic purposes. The fall of communism precipitated a clamor-
ing (from legal sellers and legal buyers) in the 1990s for legal reforms
88. EASTERLY, supra note 22, at 94.
89. See Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 137, 137-42 (Thomas Carothers ed.,
2006).
90. Troope, supra note 57, at 393.
91. See Ganev, supra note 80.
92. See Robert C. Effros, The World Bank in a Changing World: The Role of Legal
Construction, 35 INT'L LAW. 1341, 1344 (2001).
93. For an excellent account of this program and its harmful consequences see Paul
H. Brietzke, The Politics of Legal Reform, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2004).
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suited to domestic and international capitalism. Publicly held economic
assets (for example, utilities, factories, natural resources, and public trans-
portation) were sold into private hands, often at low prices, to insiders or
their families or friends, raising cries of unfairness or corruption, and
prompting calls for better laws and legal institutions.9 4 Some international
development institutions blamed the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s
on lax financial regulation and enforcement, 9 5 prompting calls for legal
reforms.9 6
Another reason for the turn to law was the dismal performance of a
large swath of nations in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia-the desper-
ate "Bottom Billion."'9 7 While countries around the globe, led by China
and India, were making dramatic economic strides, the "Bottom Billion"
countries were falling further behind. Although each failure has its own
complex of reasons, most countries have suffered under unstable or venal
governments. Aid money given to these countries to fund economic devel-
opment projects too often ended up in the overseas bank accounts of gov-
ernment officials or was spent on purchasing arms for the military.98
Improving the legal system offered the hope that legal restraints on govern-
ment and anti-corruption laws would temper this behavior.
Even countries enjoying economic improvements continue to have
large numbers of poor inhabitants located in rural areas or clustered in
makeshift urban housing developments (for example, in Manila, Mumbai,
and Mexico City). 99 Residential squatters have no legal ownership rights
to their abode and many of them work in the illegal (or unofficial) econ-
omy, and urban crime is rampant. 10 0 Legal rights and protection presuma-
bly would help improve their living circumstances and economic
prospects.
The essential role law plays in capitalism has served as a recurring
theme for more than a century, with a seminal early contribution from Max
Weber.1° 1 Property rights encourage productive activity by allowing peo-
ple to reap the rewards of their labor. Contract law enables people to con-
duct transactions at a distance over time, allowing them to reliably
calculate the costs and benefits of proposed exchanges. Criminal law
maintains social order, provides security, and saves people from expending
94. See JOHN NELLIS, RACHEL MENEZES & SARAH LUCAS, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., PRIVA-
TIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE RAPID RISE, RECENT FALL, AND CONTINUING PUZZLE OF A
CONTENTIOUS ECONOMIC POLICY 2 (2004).
95. See LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
REFORM 2 (2004).
96. See DAKOLIAS, supra note 82, at 13-14.
97. See COLLIER, supra note 23.
98. See id. at 103.
99. See WORLD BANK, E. ASIA & PAC. REG'L OFF., POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. MGMT.
SECTOR UNIT, PHILIPPINES GROWTH WITH EQUITY: THE REMAINING AGENDA, viii, 3, 16 (May.
3, 2000).
100. See Development and the Environment: Living Dangerously, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
19, 1998; Giving the Poor Their Rights, TIME, July 5, 2007.
101. See David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law
and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1972).
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resources to protect themselves or their property. Certainty, predictability,
and security, according to these views, are essential for economic activity.
The New Institutional Economics (NIE), led by Nobel Prize winning eco-
nomic historian Douglass North, boosted this basic corpus of ideas in the
1990s, arguing that the development of legal institutions, particularly the
protection of property, is an essential concomitant of economic
development. 10 2
A prominent voice from the South, Peruvian economist Hernando de
Soto, likewise highlighted the significance of property rights in develop-
ment. 10 3 In developing countries, he pointed out, a great deal of property
is not officially titled or registered, titles are subject to contesting claims,
and titling is a lengthy and costly process. As a consequence, individuals
cannot use this property as collateral to secure loans, people are less
inclined to improve their property because they fear they will lose it, and
the market for property is artificially constrained. 10 4 Much of the poten-
tial wealth and capital in developing societies is thus locked up
unproductively.
It would seem to be an obvious truth that law facilitates economic
development. The World Bank has produced statistical studies that show a
correlation between "the rule of law" and a host of development indica-
tors.10 5 Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn said "that the
empirical evidence shows a large, significant and causal relationship
between improved rule of law and income of nations, rule of law and liter-
acy, and rule of law and reduced infant mortality."'1 6 Pursuant to this
belief, the World Bank dramatically reallocated its development funding.
"Thirty years ago," observed the Senior Vice President and General Coun-
sel of the Bank, "the Bank had 58% of its portfolio in infrastructure, today
it is reduced to 22% while human development and law and institutional
reform represent 52% of our total lending."' 0 7
There are reasons to question the wisdom of the World Bank's funding
reallocation. Although a few statistical studies have shown a positive corre-
lation between the rule of law and economic development,10 3 readers must
102. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 67 (1990).
103. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000).
104. Id.
105. See Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2006, at 4 (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4280, 2007); THE WORLD BANK, WHERE IS THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS? MEASURING CAPITAL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (prepared by Kirk
Hamilton et al., 2006).
106. Press Release, The World Bank, Rule of Law Central to Fighting Poverty, Press
Relase No. 2002/013/S (July 9, 2001).
107. Robert Dafiino, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, The World Bank, The
Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Work on Human Rights, Address at the Human Rights and
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement Conference 13 (Preliminary Draft, Mar. 1,
2004).
108. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1764-71
(2002).
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consider these results with caution. The "rule of law" is not easy to mea-
sure, and often a variety of indicators are used.' 0 9 In the development con-
text, the rule of law is usually identified with property rights, contract
enforcement, low crime rates, minimal corruption, independent judiciar-
ies, legal formalism, and legal limits on government officials, while broader
versions include democracy, human rights, and welfare rights. 110 Incon-
sistent, vague, or capacious uses of the rule of law notion render unclear
that which is being measured. A study that compared commonly listed
rule of law variables found a "relatively low level of correlation both within
and across categories,""' and in some instances they were negatively cor-
related. These findings suggest that the factors that are measured in vari-
ous studies that purport to rate "rule of law" achievement levels might
actually be in tension with one another. That, in turn, raises doubts as to
which factors account for the positive correlations found with economic
development.
The correlations found, moreover, do not identify the underlying
causal relationships. 112 Perhaps economic development (initially building
on informal sources of security and certainty 1 3) prompts or leads to an
improvement in law; 114 or perhaps both economic development and the
rule of law are caused by a deeper complex of underlying (unobserved)
factors that explain their coincidence.11 5 In contrast, perhaps different sit-
uations or stages of economic and legal development manifest dissimilar
causal relationships. It is fantastic to assume that just one path of eco-
nomic development and legal development is appropriate for all places and
all times. The Western context, in which legal institutions co-evolved with
advances in capitalism, is radically unlike that which developing countries
face today in which countries often enter the global capitalist marketplace
while nurturing legal institutions at various stages of establishment.
109. See, e.g., MARK D. AGRAST ET AL., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, THE WORLD JUSTICE
PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX: MEASURING ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE
WORLD 6-7 (2008). For a critical study of such measures, see M.A. THOMAS, WHAT Do
THE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS MEASURE? (Draft, June 2008).
110. Many commentators have commented on the variety of inconsistent ways the
"rule of law" is used in the development context. See Stephan Haggard, Andrew
MacIntyre & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL.
ScI. 205, 206-209 (2008); Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions in the Rule of Law, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31 (Thomas Carothers
ed., 2006).
111. See Haggard, MacIntyre & Tiede, supra note 110, at 222.
112. One of the leading producers of these studies, Daniel Kaufmann of the World
Bank, acknowledges that questions about causality remain unresolved. See DANIEL KAUF-
MANN, RETHINKING GOVERNANCE: EMPIRICAL LESSONS CHALLENGE ORTHODOXY 17 (Draft,
Mar. 11, 2003).
113. See DANi RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007).
114. As development economist Robert Solow observed, "[clausation almost cer-
tainly goes both ways between successful economic growth and sound institutions."
ARNOLD KLING & NICK SCHULZ, Interview with Robert Solow, in, FROM POVERTY TO PROS-
PERITY: INTANGIBLE ASSETS, HIDDEN LIABILITIES AND THE LASTING TRIUMPH OVER SCARCITY
68 (2009).
115. See Haggard, Maclntyre & Tiede, supra note 110, at 206-209.
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Nor is it clear that positive correlations actually exist between the rule
of law and economic development. A recent study of purported develop-
ment variables found that, when margins of error and differences in
income estimates are taken into consideration, no robust findings hold
with respect to any particular growth determinants, including legal fac-
tors.1 16 The only consensus among development economists about cur-
rent economic research appears to be that "there is no consensus on 'what
works' for growth and development."' "17
Skeptics of the claim that the rule of law is essential to economic devel-
opment are quick to point out that this proposition is belied by economic
events. If the "rule of law" is taken to include property rights, contract
enforcement, and independent courts applying the law, then the claimed
connection is hard to square with the fact that the most spectacular recent
examples of economic development-China especially"1 - did not meet
these legal prerequisites. 1 9 Much of the productive property during the
boom in China has been collectively owned. Networks of relations among
business people can be more important to transactions than contract law.
China, Korea, and Taiwan made early economic strides by ignoring intellec-
tual property rights (reverse engineering products, selling knock offs or
pirated goods). 120 Judicial decisions in China are subject to review by
political authorities, while Korean and Taiwanese judges during their boom
period were far from independent.1 2 '
A serious case can be made that Asian style neo-mercantilism and eco-
nomic nationalism-which include state control of natural resources and
state run investment funds, and export oriented production combined with
import barriers that protect national industries' 2 2 -are superior to free
market capitalism for the purposes of rapid economic development, at least
in initial stages.' 2 3 Western nations also practiced mercantilist strategies
in their early stages of economic development. 1 24 The Growth Report, a
2008 study issued by the World Bank, found that a common element of
116. See ANTONIO CICCONE & MAREKJAROCINSKI, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH:
WILL DATA TELL? (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.antoniociccone.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2009/10/growth-determinantswp.pdf.
117. Cohen & Easterly, supra note 28, at 1.
118. See Donald Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in China's
Economic Development, in CHINA'S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 376 (Loren
Brandt & Thomas C. Rawski eds., 2008).
119. See Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from
East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 829 (2000); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-
Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 75
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
120. SeeJohn K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 275
(2007).
121. Id.
122. See IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN
STATES AND CORPORATIONS? 126-28 (2010).
123. Ohnesorge, supra note 120, at 225.
124. ERIK S. REINERT, HOW RICH COUNTRIES GOT RICH... AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES
STAY POOR ch. 3 (2007).
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development success stories of the last twenty-five years is a strong, devel-
opment-oriented state. 12
5
The standard recipe for economic success in contemporary global cap-
italism (on the first rung of the economic development ladder) is to mass-
produce low cost goods for export. To attract transnational investors to
supply capital and technology for production facilities, countries must
offer a large, educated pool of low-wage disciplined labor, low taxes, an
adequate transportation infrastructure, and protections for foreign invest-
ment.126 Agreements to resolve disputes in international tribunals or in
private arbitration (bypassing the national court system), as well as credi-
ble assurances from government officials that production facilities and
earnings will not be expropriated, can satisfy the latter factor. 12 7 Protec-
tion against government seizure of assets, it is essential to note, is more a
matter of political stability and credibility than enacted laws, which can be
easily avoided. Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) have successfully
attracted investment to a number of lesser-developed countries through
this formula.
Countries that provide these conditions-delivering the specific types
of legal support that matters for foreign corporations and investors-can
undergo rapid economic development, even if the legal system as a whole
fails to meet rule of law criteria. East Asia's development successes, which
took place under semi-authoritarian governments, have demonstrated that
"centralized systems are capable of creating a stable, predictable, and there-
fore credible regime for investors even if corruption is a component of the
operating environment."' 128
These successful counter-examples expose a significant point easily
obscured by the emphasis on the rule of law for development: there are
limitless possible variations in informal and formal legal arrangements
that can satisfy economic needs. The functions law provides for capitalist
development -especially security and certainty-can, under some circum-
stances, be adequately filled by alternative informal or formal mecha-
nisms.129 Judiciaries that lack independence on political matters can
nonetheless enjoy independence to decide economic cases in accordance
with the law.' 30 A range of substantive legal regimes can work. 13 1 Real
property need not be privately held or alienable, as China has demon-
strated, to be used productively for economic purposes. Although de Soto
125. The World Bank, Comm'n on Growth & Dev., The Growth Report: Strategies for
Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development 2 (2008).
126. See generally JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006).
127. See COLLIER, supra note 23, at 153-54.
128. Haggard, MacIntyre & Tiede, supra note 110, at 212.
129. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATE MODES OF GOVERN-
ANCE (2004).
130. See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Independence in East Asia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAw PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010).
131. See RODRK, supra note 113; Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal
Reforms and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 21, 26-27 (2001).
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is a tireless advocate of titling property, he acknowledges that informal
forms of ownership also provide the basis for economic transactions
(although less efficiently). 1 3 2 Empirical studies of titling projects of the
type de Soto advocates, on the other hand, show mixed results-sometimes
they facilitate economic activities and sometimes not.13 3
The variability of legal arrangements in connection with economic
development is yet another iteration of the connectedness of law principle.
This principle is built into NIE, which recognizes that legal institutions
operate within and are supported by surrounding social and cultural com-
plexes of norms and beliefs-economic performance is ultimately a prod-
uct of this totality. NIE is frequently cited for the proposition that law is
necessary for economic development, but that neglects this more funda-
mental point drawn out by North:
It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement
characteristics that shapes economic performance. While the rules may be
changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only gradually.
Since it is the norms that provide 'legitimacy' to a set of rules, revolutionary
change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire, and performance
will be different than anticipated. And economies that adopt the formal
rules of another economy will have very different performance characteris-
tics than the first economy because of different informal norms and
enforcement. 13
4
Another important contributor to NIE, Oliver Williamson, emphasizes
similarly that formal legal institutions operate within a more fundamental
"social embeddedness level. This is where the norms, customs, mores, tra-
ditions, etc. are located. ' 135 The forces and influences at this more funda-
mental level change slowly over the course of decades in ways that elude
deliberate design or manipulation.
An unsettling irony hovers over the current popularity of rule of law
for development. Turning to rule of law reform to overcome failures in
economic development substitutes one set of seemingly intractable
problems for an even tougher set of problems. Improving the law depends
upon a multitude of supportive social, cultural, political, and economic
conditions, whereas selected improvements in economic performance can
be made without a comprehensive legal system.
As indicated at the outset of this essay, discourse within "law and
development" as well as development economics exhibit striking parallels.
Both have traveled the same circle. Just as "law and development" practi-
tioners and theorists admit that they have little knowledge of what works in
legal development, economists acknowledge: "we know precious little
132. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 38 FIN. & DEV. 1 (2001).
133. Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 131; Cross, supra note 108.
134. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. EcON. REv. 359,
366 (1994). See NORTH, supra note 102, wherein North emphasizes the shaping influ-
ence of surrounding social factors.
135. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. EcoN. LIT. 595, 596 (2000).
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about how to make growth happen." 13 6 The collapse of the Washington
Consensus dissipated the former "confidence [among economists] that
they have the correct recipe, or that privatization, stabilization, and liberal-
ization can be implemented in similar ways in different parts of the
world."'13 7 Just as law and development specialists now advocate moving
away from "cookie cutter" approaches and urge attention to context, econo-
mists too "focus on the need to get away from 'one-size-fits all' strategies
and on context specific solutions."'1 38 Development economists have even
articulated an exact cognate of the connectedness of law principle: "what
might be the single most important insight of the field of economics-that
you have to be aware of the fact that everything is connected to everything
else."1 39
What I have coined the "connectedness of law" principle is the legal
angle on what is ultimately the connectedness of society-the entirety of
which includes culture, politics, economics, law, and everything else. Each
thread within this totality touches every other. Pulling or cutting a thread,
or adding a new set of threads, produces reactions and adjustments else-
where (especially reactions by elite interests that strive to maintain or
recover the status-quo arrangement140 ); endogenously and exogenously
generated change continually takes place within all societies, but this pro-
cess always occurs within the shaping contours of the existing fabric.
There are too many scarcely visible and complexly interacting moving
parts within this totality for us to deliberately engineer development in the
desired ways.
V. The Progressive Law and Development Package
A more recent stream within law and development is pushing for
expansion beyond just economic development to encompass other inte-
grated reforms as well.14 1 Amartya Sen influentially advances a compre-
hensive approach to development:
The claim here is not so much that, say, legal development causally influ-
ences development tout court, but rather that development as a whole cannot
be considered separately from legal development. Indeed, in this view, the
overarching idea of development is a functional relation that amalgamates
distinct developmental concerns respectively in economic, political, social,
legal and other spheres. This is more than causal interdependence: it
involves a constitutive connection in the concept of development as a
136. Abhijit V. Banerjee, Big Answers for Big Questions: The Presumption of Growth Pol-
icy, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL 207, 209 (jes-
sica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009).
137. Dani Rodrik, The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, But How
Shall We Learn?, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL 40
(Jessica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009).
138. Id.
139. Banerjee, supra note 136, at 207.
140. See NORTH, supra note 102, at 101.
141. See Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 49,
49 (2009)
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Sen's vision-another articulation of the connectedness of law princi-
ple-includes equitable development (a fair distribution of wealth), an ade-
quate social safety net, protection from violence and insecurity, democracy
and political liberties, a free media, and women's rights-all in the further-
ance of enhancing people's capabilities and freedom. This puts at issue the
very meaning of "development," challenging the dominant assumption that
it should be defined exclusively in terms of economic growth.
When the momentum of neo-liberal economic reforms receded at the
turn of the twenty-first century, the World Bank tentatively broached a
more expansive vision of the scope of legal reform: "The rule of law is
essential to equitable economic development and sustainable poverty reduc-
tion .... Vulnerable individuals, including women and children, are unpro-
tected from violence and other forms of abuse that exacerbate
inequalities."14 3 Law and development initiatives began to address a pack-
age that included "economic development, poverty reduction, democracy,
human rights, due process, equity, etc."' 144
In contrast to the conservative cast of the law and capitalism stream
discussed above, the broader law and development stream is often taken up
by progressives. The previous emphasis on property rights and commer-
cial law now shares space with attention to political, civil, and welfare
rights. A conspicuous tension lurks just beneath the surface of these
respective emphases. Progressive proponents of the expansive view are
skeptical of the unchecked spread of global capitalism, they raise concerns
about its adverse human and environmental consequences, and they doubt
its fairness in the selection of winners, losers and the distributions of bene-
fits. ' 4 5 Making odd bedfellows, conservatives and progressives pitch their
contrasting programs and objectives under the same umbrella of "rule of
law" development.
There is an element of faith and an element of opportunism in the
progressive law and development package. The faith element is the belief
or hope that the reform package hangs together. A mutually reinforcing
circle exists, according to this faith, in which the rule of law begets democ-
racy, which begets social welfare capitalism, which begets liberal rights,
which begets women's rights. The causal arrows presumably go in all
directions, each supporting the other, with the rule of law bearing substan-
tial weight and responsibility for the whole. 146 This same faith was behind
the eagerness of the U.S. to promote rule of law reform in China, in the
optimistic hope that legal reform would naturally "seep into other
142. Amartya Sen, What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in The Development
Process?, Address at the World Bank Legal Conference 8 (June 5, 2000).
143. Santos, supra note 47, at 276 (quoting THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK
ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 77).
144. DAKOLIAS, supra note 82, at 10.
145. See Daffino, supra note 107, at 12-13.
146. For a realistic articulation of the supportive interconnections see O'Donnell,
supra note 77.
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areas,"147 eventually bringing greater democracy and human rights in its
wake.
The opportunistic element arises when those who do not share this
faith nonetheless strategically reason that their own preferred part of the
package can be advanced by hitching a ride on the rule of law bandwagon.
In this vein, David Trubek, a long-time law and development scholar, who
is openly skeptical of the rule of law, nonetheless urges that "progressive
intellectuals should engage constructively with the ROL enterprise"
because it provides a vehicle to fight for progressive goals. 148
The promise that developing the rule of law will bring these other
goods has not been borne out by events, at least not so far. As Carothers
points out, China and Russia have loudly embraced the rule of law while
tightly controlling democracy and rights; and they are not alone. 149 "In all
these countries," he observed, "strong-hand rulers have found that the rule
of law works well as an alternative objective to democratization, not one
that complements it[,] but rather one that will help preserve authoritarian
or semi-authoritarian rule."' 5 0 The rule of law-law setting limits on gov-
ernment-can be easily transposed into rule by law-law as an instrument
of government rule.5 'I A number of Latin American countries combine
democratic elections, powerful executives, weak courts, and harsh legal sys-
tems. 152 A Latin American scholar made "the regretful observation that at
times the rule of law (or at any rate the rhetoric of the rule of law) has been
employed in the service of authoritarian ideologies."' 5 3
The abiding belief in courts as the bulwark of law, liberty, democracy,
and rights has suffered repeated disappointments. In an effort to promote
the enactment of a criminal code in Russia that provided due process and
fair trial protections for defendants, the U.S. government hosted training
seminars and conferences for numerous judges and lawyers (in the
"thousands"), and paid for Russian judges to come to the U.S. for seminars
and dinners, hoping they would be advocates for the reform. 154 When the
code came up for enactment, however, most judges and lawyers "were part
of the chorus that opposed the reform." 155 A USAID sponsored program in
El Salvador to improve judicial administration and the criminal justice sys-
tem "came to grief' owing to "powerful resistance to reform" from
judges. 156
147. Stephenson, supra note 43, at 14.
148. David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and
Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74, 93-94 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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The results of reform efforts depend upon how they interact with the
surrounding complex of factors-the connectedness of law principle-and
this can go in any direction. It depends upon the incentives at play (who
stands to gain or lose money, status, or power), the court's locus in the
surrounding constellation of power, popular attitudes toward law and
courts, and a host of other possible factors. There is no doubt that the rule
of law, democracy, civil rights, and social welfare capitalism can exist in a
mutually supporting fashion as they do in the West. Nothing inherent to
the rule of law, however, leads to the replication of this arrangement in the
countries that are the targets of law and development projects, which have
vastly different social-cultural-economic-political-legal dynamics.
Participants in the law and development enterprise know this already.
Few people familiar with actual conditions in target countries can san-
guinely believe that the rule of law has the power to remake societies
around the world to resemble the desired progressive vision. It is perhaps
obvious, though still worth stating, that much law and development activ-
ity and talk-in both conservative and progressive variants-is ideologi-
cally driven advocacy.
VI. The Law and Development Enterprise
The preceding analysis has examined failures on the receiving end of
law and development activities. Now I will take a close look at the delivery
end. As argued earlier, it is a mistake to conflate law and development
with legal development. Law and development is better understood as a set
of activities generated by funding entities from advanced capitalist
countries.
Law and development activities ramped up in the early 1990s when
the World Bank embraced rule of law building. Before this could happen,
however, a major obstacle had to be overcome. A specific limitation on
expenditures is written into the World Bank's Articles of Agreement (the
charter that created and controls the Bank): "Loans made or guaranteed by
the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for the purpose of spe-
cific projects of reconstruction or development."157 A separate clause pro-
hibits the Bank from engaging in political activities: "The Bank and its
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the mem-
ber or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be rele-
vant to their decisions[.]"15 8 These provisions were in keeping with the
purpose for which the World Bank-officially the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development-was created in the mid-1940s, amidst
the wreckage left by World War II, to help finance economic recovery. 159
157. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IRBD], Articles of
Agreement art. I1, § 4(vii). The official name for the World Bank is the IRBD.
158. Id. art. IV, § 10.
159. See FRIEDEN, supra note 22, at 58-60, 69.
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In the early 1990s, World Bank General Counsel Dr. Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata issued a series of legal opinions that effectively re-wrote the stated
limits in the Articles restricting funding to economic development projects
to allow funding for rule of law projects. 160 He subtly accomplished this in
the following passage: "Under normal circumstances, Bank loans and guar-
antees are to finance specific projects in the broad sense of this term,
which, in my view, includes all well-defined productive purposes whether
these are served directly (such as in industry and agriculture) or indirectly
(such as in infrastructure, institution building, social services, etc.)."' 16 1
The inclusion of "institution building" opened the door for legal develop-
ment. World Bank money began pouring into rule of law projects.
There is a discomfiting incongruity in the fact that rule of law projects
are now funded on a grand scale thanks to a de facto unannounced amend-
ment of the Bank's "constitution" engineered by its top lawyer 162 (although
others in the organization must have agreed with this shift). Shihata's sup-
porters applaud his "suppleness of interpretation" as necessary to keep the
Bank's activities in sync with changing times. 163 Yet it is dubious as a mat-
ter of fidelity to law.
Once the door was opened for rule of law reform, initially with a nar-
row concentration on property rights, commercial law, and judicial
reform, it was gradually pushed wider to include aspects of the progressive
development package. As the scope of rule of law projects expanded, with
funding for economic projects regularly conditioned on acceptance of rule
of law requirements, these actions push up against the Bank's explicit pro-
hibition against interfering in the political affairs of recipient nations.
This event has been recounted not to cast aspersions on Shihata's
motives, but to concretely illustrate that rule of law promotion is the result
of the efforts of individuals who aggressively moved it to the center of the
development agenda. Lawyers propose, organize, and carry out the
projects, involving independent law and development consultants, creators
and employees of NGOs, staff lawyers in development organizations, and
law professors. From the standpoint of lawyers, rule of law projects are
undoubtedly worthwhile. It adds to the attraction for participants that law
and development work offers travel to exotic lands while engaging in good
deeds. Because the projects are designed and carried out by lawyers, they
naturally center on what legal professionals are familiar with-judges, law-
yers, police, and legal codes. As a critic of land reform in Africa empha-
sized, to understand the orientation of law and development projects one
must pay attention to the agency of lawyers-to "the entrepreneurial activi-
ties of legal professionals." ]64
160. This account is taken from an admiring recounting by Robert C. Effros, supra
note 92, at 1341.
161. Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
162. See John K. M. Ohnesorge, On Rule of Law Rhetoric, Economic Development, and
Northeast Asia, 25 Wis. INT'L. LJ. 301, 306 (2007).
163. Effros, supra note 92, at 1348.
164. AMBREENA S. MANJI, THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM IN AFRICA: FROM COMMUNAL
TENURE TO FREE MARKETS 82 (2006).
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The bustle of rule of law projects around the world gives the appear-
ance of a flourishing activity on the surface. But participants in this enter-
prise have exposed its internal flaws. "Unlike the development
professionals who dominate many other areas of development aid, many
Western rule-of-law aid practitioners have little or no prior experience in
developing and transitional societies .... -165 It would not immediately
occur to lawyers that law itself might be a part of the problem or that a
more effective solution might lie elsewhere; nor would lawyers easily know
where to look to find alternatives to law. "Senior judges, ambitious young
lawyers, or retired police officers are often placed in positions of designing
or managing projects, providing advice to local counterparts, or delivering
training."16 6 These legal missionaries often have scant awareness of how
transplanted law operates, or does not operate, in radically different social
and cultural contexts.
Another common flaw is that the people who carry out these projects
frequently know little about local circumstances. It can take six months to
a year living in a society for an outsider to acquire a feel for the social-
political-cultural dynamics, building trust and relationships that will help
in the implementation process.' 6 7 One rule of law project coordinator
revealed that "[i]n ten years of recruiting and fielding consultants ... I have
generally had to fight for permission to provide those consultants with
more than two days of preparation time .... -168 "It is not surprising then
that many of these consultants show up insufficiently prepared for the spe-
cific setting, though well versed in their subject matter specialty."'1 69 Rou-
tine staff rotations within donor agencies and among practitioners in the
field move out people who have learned the lay of the land and formed
social bonds, replacing them with people who must start all over gaining
familiarity and developing relationships. 170
Projects run in this fashion have severely reduced their already small
chance of success from the start. One veteran practitioner highlighted this
fundamental flaw:
Particularly during project development, when the very nature of the project
is decided, many agencies rely on visiting consultants rather than in-country
staff. This can lead to a superficial analysis of what ails a legal system and
what legal issues confront the disadvantaged. To put the point mildly, a
165. Golub, supra note 50, at 127. See Piron, supra note 51, at 295.
166. Piron, supra note 51, at 294.
167. My two-year sojourn in Yap bears this out. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTAND-
ING LAW IN MICRONESIA: AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO TRANSPLANTED LAW (1993). A cau-
tionary tale may illustrate the point. During my tenure there, two external education
consultants came to Yap for a two week visit, interviewed a number of officials (includ-
ing me, in my capacity as legal advisor of the Education Department), and subsequently
wrote a report outlining proposed reforms of the education system. The report was
based upon an inaccurate understanding of the actual dynamics of the situation, and to
my knowledge it came to nothing (although the consultants earned a handsome sum for
their efforts).
168. Channell, supra note 89, at 150.
169. Id.
170. See Piron, supra note 51, at 295.
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society seen from a hotel is far different from one experienced every day. 17 1
Further problems are created by the ways projects are funded,
designed and assigned. 172 Donor institutions, development agencies, or
NGOs may administer co-existing programs in the same countries without
coordination or sharing knowledge. 173 Money comes in chunks that must
be spent (or revert back), preferably with something concrete to show at
the end, while it is harder to obtain a continuous funding stream for
projects that continue for several years. 1 74 Many projects supported by the
United States through USAID are administered by private, profit seeking
organizations. The process of competitive bidding for projects, with large
sums at stake, discourages innovation (untried or risky plans are less likely
to be selected) and promotes secrecy within the consulting community. 175
Requests by development agencies for additional grants from governments
or funding sources are bolstered by citing past successes. One critic
charged that "the tendency to claim enormous impact for legal and judicial
reform projects is widespread," although the real benefits are hard to
assess.' 76 Concrete technical assistance projects-for instance, holding
training seminars for lawyers or judges, computerizing court systems-are
easier to check off as successfully completed at the end of the project
period, even when the actual improvements in the delivery of justice
achieved are minimal. One must keep in mind that "[1]egal reform is a
business."' 77
Few people involved in law and development appear to think these
projects work in any deep sense, at least not in the short term. Small
improvements in institutional functioning can be achieved, but the overall
inadequacies of a legal system face down these efforts like an immovable
object. Recall that the frequent failure of economic development initiatives
helped turn efforts towards legal development on the theory that economic
development was being inhibited by a faulty legal infrastructure. However,
legal development suffers the same persistent failures.
So why do rule of law projects, with their negligible results, continue
to receive generous financial support? Factories have architectural plans,
are built in a determinate period, and achieve commercial success or bleed
money until they are shuttered. In contrast, the rule of law has no
blueprint, no standard structure, no concrete or visible manifestation, and
it is not something that can be constructed on demand. There is no known
timetable for building the rule of law. It may take decades or generations
or centuries. An assessment of the value and effectiveness of rule of law
171. Golub, supra note 50, at 130.
172. For an extensive account of U.S. efforts, see Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?:
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Com-
munist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L. EcON. L. 179 (1999).
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projects can thus be postponed indefinitely, while a continuous flow of
projects are funded and carried out.
VII. The Risks of Transplanting the Battle of Ideas
The two streams of law and development discourse discussed above-
"law and capitalism" and the progressive package-reflect, and are champi-
oned by, competing conservative and liberal ideas respectively from West-
ern capitalist societies. These "palace wars in the North," as one
commentator put it, are being exported to and played out in the South.
178
Unfortunately, these familiar protagonists commit a serious error when
they fail to attend to the untoward consequences that might result owing to
underlying differences between the exporting and the receiving societies.
A prominent example of such blindness from each side will be offered to
make this point.
High on the agenda of law and capitalism advocates is that developing
countries must title property and allow it to be freely alienable; this will
enable people to borrow from banks to engage in entrepreneurial activities,
using the land as collateral. 179 Their theory is that owners will improve
property, increasing its value and leading to more economically productive
uses. That is how capital is freed up in the West. Things are different
elsewhere, however. Property in many societies is conceived of and con-
trolled in a variety of ways that do not match freehold ownership by indi-
viduals. In such societies, family and clan members have various
capacities to use land-to cross it, graze their animals on it, collect its
fruits, till it-and others must be consulted about what happens to the
land. The process of titling property will inevitably extinguish much of
this because banks do not favor encumbered collateral.
But the adverse consequences are potentially much worse. In many
societies, community life is anchored to, and revolves around, the land in
ways that rootless Western societies have long forgotten. 180 Allowing the
land to be taken and disposed of by banks will fundamentally disrupt
social relations. In the West, if you default on the loan you lose your
house; in these societies the social life of the community is upended' 8 1
and the dispossessed lose their gathering place, where they live, and their
source of food. Moreover, the position of women stands to be adversely
affected because ownerships rights in many cultures, when forced to iden-
tify a single titular "owner," will favor men. 18 2 The distribution and uses
of land will also inevitably change, accumulating in the hands of wealthy
buyers, which will bring further social dislocations in its wake. Negative
178. Garth, supra note 33, at 393-96.
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consequences will also follow from titling property in the massive shanty
towns, ghettos, or favelas that now crowd major urban centers around the
world. Squatters who secure title will lose their abode when they default
on their loans, ending up homeless or moving in with already crowded
relatives; savvy buyers will collect property at foreclosure sales, increasing
their holdings. One must not forget that titling to produce collateral for
loans inevitably means that, when loans are not duly paid, land will be lost
and redistributed.
These potential consequences must be weighed against the economic
benefits that purportedly will accrue from aggressively spreading private
ownership of property. An articulate advocate, Kenneth Dam, acknowl-
edges that communal societies will undergo significant changes from
titling, but he perfunctorily reports that this same transformation also
occurred early in the history of the West and things worked out for the
better there. 183 People in developing countries, many of whom do not
identify with Western ways, might not find this reassuring. Dam's
(mis)analogy to the evolution of property rights in the West also fails to
appreciate the major implications that follow from the non-evolutionary,
sudden introduction of fee simple title registration systems into contexts
already thick with recognized customary rules about property. This transi-
tion creates a situation with multiple potentially clashing, competing rule
systems, 18 4 resulting in greater uncertainty about property rights and the
potential for opportunistic resort to these systems. 185
Local inhabitants should at least be fully apprised of, and consulted
on, the adverse social consequences of the campaign to title property. Peo-
ple must think about what kind of development they want and at what cost
to their lives and community.
The radical left, on its part, likewise commits a serious mistake when
carrying-over its theoretical assumptions. In the 1970s and 1980s, Critical
Legal theorists from elite law schools in the United States engaged in a
thoroughgoing critique of "legal liberalism." Their basic argument was that
the rule of law operates under a guise of neutrality which conceals that the
law maintains an unjust social order in the service of the elite. 186 Critical
Legal theorists were especially scathing about legal formalism, which they
attacked as a false claim of objective rule application, when the truth is that
indeterminate legal rules allow judges substantial room to maneuver. 187
Judges are deluded if they reason formalistically because they possess sub-
stantial freedom in legal interpretation; they are deceptive when they hide
behind formalist rule-bound reasoning to come to preferred ends while
pretending that the decision was compelled by the law. Critical Legal theo-
183. DAM, supra note 179, at 150-57.
184. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to
Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008).
185. For an example of this uncertainty, see EASTERLY, supra note 22 at 95-97.
186. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
ch. 6, 7 (2006).
187. Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561,
573 (1983).
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rist David Trubek, a prominent voice in law and development for decades,
and others, have carried this skepticism about and antagonism toward
legal formalism into the law and development context. 188
Again, this overlooks a crucial difference. While it is healthy to
expose the exaggerations of legal formalism in Western legal systems
where the legal systems are well-entrenched, it is an entirely different mat-
ter to export skepticism about legal formalism to societies in which law
barely functions. Skeptical views of legal formalism can prevent a legal
system from getting off the ground. A legal system cannot work if the very
notion that legal officials are rule-bound is perceived to be a fraud. In the
absence of any legal restraints, power has its way, and the powerless mass
of people in developing countries will have little protection.
In both forgoing examples, from the right and the left respectively,
theoretical ideas that grew up within Western contexts have very different
implications when brought over and played out in development contexts.
That is what the connectedness of law principle advises, and anyone who
fails to consider this will provoke unanticipated and undesired
consequences.
VIII. "Law and Development" is Not Legal Development
At the outset of this essay I asserted that it is best not to see "law and
development" as a "field," but instead as a label we attach to a host of
projects funded and carried out by an array of development organizations
aimed at countries that are tagged as insufficiently advanced capitalist
economies or lacking features of liberal democracies. "Legal develop-
ment," I argued, is not the same as "law and development" -which the coin-
cident phraseology tends to obscure. To perceive this more easily, imagine,
if you will, how things would look if all current law and development
projects around the world were to cease-immediately.
In core respects very little would change. Legal institutions in all of
these countries would continue what they are doing. Legal actors would go
about their business of constructing the law on an ongoing basis. These
legal systems would suffer from manifold flaws (as do all legal systems).
Actors within these societies-government, businesses, organizations, and
individuals-would continue to interact with the legal system in the usual
ways they do (invoking it, avoiding it, adhering to it, trying to control it, or
using it to their advantage). Legal actors and non-legal actors would push
and prod the legal system in connection with demands that emerge within
society. This is the ongoing process of legal development that takes place
in every organized society that has, at least, a minimally functioning legal
system.
That is not to say that no consequences will follow from the termina-
tion of law and development projects. Money that now goes into these
projects-several billion dollars since 1990-would disappear, along with
188. For a recent example of this skepticism, see Trubek, supra note 148.
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the widely dispersed small army of law and development practitioners.
When divided up by country over time, this apparently large sum is less
impressive. For large countries, taking away this money will have hardly
any impact on the daily functioning of the system. For small or very poor
countries, the financial loss would be felt, but the consequences of this loss
depend upon what law and development money was being spent on.
Development organizations from donor countries take a sizable chunk of
the money to fund their own operations-money that recipient countries
never see. Salaries of legal officials are rarely covered by law and develop-
ment funding, so the legal systems in recipient countries would continue to
operate as before; but certain costly technical projects, like computeriza-
tion, would not. There will be fewer judicial training seminars run by out-
siders, fewer conferences, and fewer trips abroad for local officials.
Some of the projects that now take place through law and development
would likely still be proposed. Many of the same reformist ideas circulate
in every society today (promoted by activists, elites, economic actors, law-
yers committed to legal reform, etc.). Corrupt or poorly functioning legal
systems are universally lamented. Businesses and local communities need
reliable and timely ways to resolve their disputes. The rights of laborers
and women are issues facing every society. Attempts to address these
problems will continue, though the amount of money backing it will
diminish.
However, it is also likely that a different set of legal development
projects would emerge than the projects now promoted through law and
development, and the projects would almost certainly take a different
form. Without enjoying an artificial boost from money and pressure from
the outside, legal development projects must marshal sufficient local sup-
port from influential players to prevail in local socio-political contests over
reform. Local agendas and priorities would be pursued. The projects
would be designed, run, and implemented by people who understand the
situation, who know what is possible and understand what compromises
must be made, and who have long term relationships-social and political
capital-to draw on in the course of implementation. None of this assures
the success of legal development initiatives because legal development in
every country is uneven-but this consummately local process of legal
reform avoids several of the key flaws that now plague law and develop-
ment projects.
One implication of this thought experiment is that the failures of law
and development projects in the past five decades does not entail that legal
development is failing. Rather, it means that law and development
projects-mostly related to the establishment of capitalist, democratic, and
liberal legal institutions-are not showing much success. Legal develop-
ment still takes place, although not according to, or in compliance with,
this formula.
China, for example, is regularly cited as a failure in law and develop-
ment literature for not establishing independent courts, for corruption, for
the harassment of activist lawyers, and for continued Party control over the
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judiciary.' 8 9 Yet in the past twenty-five years many new laws have been
passed, the number of cases handled by the Chinese court system has
increased tenfold, a national code is being prepared, a master's degree in
law is virtually required for a senior judicial position, the number of law-
yers in private practice has gone from zero (previously all lawyers were
employees of the state) to 118,000 licensed lawyers in 12,000 firms, and
now more than 150,000 suits are filed annually against the government. 190
That is substantial legal development'91 -none of which can be directly
attributed to law and development projects.
A similar, albeit less optimistic, observation can be made about Rus-
sia, also frequently pegged as a failure. Corruption and political interfer-
ence are widely thought to be endemic in Russian courts19 2 ; yet, the
number of civil cases handled by courts has more than doubled in the past
decade, showing that the Russian people resort to the courts in increasing
numbers. 193 Russian citizens apparently draw a distinction between
"[cases] involving ordinary citizens," in which they expect the court to
render a fair disposition, and "[cases] involving the state and/or individu-
als or entities with disproportionate power," which are prime targets for
corruption and political influence. 1 94 This too represents real legal
development.
This thought experiment helps expose that law and development
projects are interventions in a legal system from the outside. This observa-
tion is not itself a reason for condemnation-many of these initiatives are
well intentioned and might have positive consequences for the receiving
society, if they worked. This observation merely highlights a crucial fact
that conditions their operation and diminishes their likelihood of success.
External interventions into any society face additional barriers that inter-
nally produced initiatives do not. Law poses a particular challenge for
external initiatives because law is imbricated within a thick complex of
internally evolved normative orderings, power bases, and incentives that
can be nearly imperceptible from the outside.
1 9 5
Finally, this thought experiment makes clear that while law and devel-
opment projects are uniformly presented as being for the benefit of recipi-
ent countries and their people, they are often not by or of recipient
countries and their people. Lurking in the background of the law and
development enterprise is the fact that many of these legal initiatives are
189. See John L. Thornton, Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China,
87 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 10-13 (2008).
190. Id. at 10-11.
191. For more evidence of legal development, see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002).
192. Kathryn Hendley, 'Telephone law' and the 'Rule of Law': The Russian Case, 1
HAGUE J. RULE L. 241, 248-57 (2009).
193. Id. at 243.
194. Id. at 253.
195. An overview of this can be found in TtAmAN-H, supra note 59. One of the best
studies of the barriers that law must confront is SALLY FALK MOORE, LAw AS PROCESS: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978).
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not consensual, but are imposed in the form of conditions that must be
met by recipient countries to secure loans from international funding insti-
tutions196 or that are pressed by outsider activist NGOs that claim to speak
for the people.197 Rule of law initiatives are dominated by the agendas and
ideological views (including modernization assumptions) of the promoters
on the delivery side-whether transnational corporations or investors seek-
ing legal protections, or selfless advocates of human rights-more than
they are about finding concrete ways to serve the pressing needs of the
receiving populace.
IX. Moving Forward
Legal development tends to be more complex and challenging in devel-
oping contexts for four reasons in particular. Many of these societies must
grapple with the conflicts and tensions created by the presence of compet-
ing and overlapping cultural, ethnic, religious, and legal orders. 198 In
many of these societies, significant portions of the law have been trans-
planted from elsewhere and, thus, are unfamiliar to, clash with, or are dis-
tant from the social life and understandings of the populace. 199 Their
legal systems are often weakly institutionalized and have limited power,
especially outside of urban areas. Moreover, in a number of countries, the
government (including officials, legislators, and members of the judiciary)
is under the grip of a cabal or is fraught with corruption and entrenched
interests which benefit from the status quo. Hence legal reform projects
are typically run through, or are administered by (or require the coopera-
tion of), the very officials who stand to lose if the reforms are effective. 200
Despite the largely negative tenor of this essay, which is the product of
the focus herein on the failures of law and development efforts, it must be
emphasized that the message of this essay is not to turn away from legal
development. Every society in the world today requires an effective legal
system that can, at a minimum, manage and support the activities of gov-
ernmental and economic systems. The great benefit of the rule of law, fur-
thermore, is in erecting legal restraints on the government-and an
effective state legal system can deliver this type of restraint. 20 1 For these
reasons, law must develop and every effort should be made to help legal
institutions develop in positive ways, with the awareness that this is a
unceasing project. It will help to keep in mind that legal development is
not about developing the "rule of law" as such. Legal development is a
retail enterprise-it is about getting legal institutions to adequately deliver
basic services to meet legal demands.
196. See EASTERLY, supra note 22 at 146.
197. See Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, "Global Civil Society": A Sceptical View, in
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5 (2005).
198. See generally Tamanaha, supra note 184.
199. See TAMANAHA, supra note 59, ch. 5.
200. See EASTERLY, supra note 22, ch. 4.
201. See TAMANAHA, supra note 151, ch. 11.
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Above all else, it is essential in law and development to be clear about
the specific objective at hand, and then ask what might best work to
achieve the objective. Let us assume, for instance, that the goal is to
increase overall societal wealth by producing goods for export in global
markets. Relying upon historical, theoretical, and statistical knowledge
about law and capitalism can be misleading. Even if it is true that property
rights are historically associated with the growth of capitalism and that
studies show a positive correlation between property rights and economic
development, it does not necessarily follow that the best strategy to
advance the goal of economic development in a given country is to build
the legal system. If the state legal system is caught in a constellation of
forces-a structural trap that relentlessly defangs legal reform efforts-then
the best strategy might well be to circumvent the state legal system and
find, or create, other institutional arrangements that facilitate economic
activities. It might turn out that as the economic performance of a given
country increases, the legal system will also gradually improve-perhaps
because a larger pool of educated people develops, the middle class
expands and demands better essential legal services, adequate funding
becomes available to support legal institutions, or economic incentives
reward, and hence encourage, a more reliable and efficient legal system.
None of this is guaranteed, of course. What happens is always a product of
the mixture of surrounding factors, but this reverse or concurrent causa-
tion is as plausible as current claims that improving the law will improve
economic performance.
20 2
A nagging discrepancy dogs the present emphasis on the rule of law
for economic development. Developing countries need economic develop-
ment now. There is general agreement, however, that establishing the rule
of law is a long-term project which no one knows how to accomplish.
Meanwhile, recent experience confirms that explosive economic progress
can occur in the absence of the rule of law.
It is hard to identify even a single example of the rule of law coming to
prevail in a society through the deliberate implementation of policies aimed
at developing the rule of law. Talk about the rule of law in the development
context-in particular the assumptions that it is a particular institutional
arrangement that can be reproduced or encapsulated and measured by
"rule of law indices"-glosses over a host of contestable issues. The rule of
law is an ideal that does not mean any single thing.20 3 No two realizations
of the rule of law ideal are alike. No two sets of institutional arrangements
are alike or function in the same way. The rule of law in Japan is not like
the rule of law in the United States, which is not like the rule of law in
France, and so on. Standard institutional arrangements are shells filled in
and given shape and form by surrounding cultural, economic, political and
legal circumstances.
202. Development economist Robert Solow asserts that "Causation almost certainly
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Let us assume, secondly, that the goals (apart from producing steady
economic growth) are to build a democratic polity, protect civil rights, cre-
ate safe working conditions, have a fair and equitable distribution of
wealth, engage in environmentally sensitive development, and empower
women-the progressive law agenda. There is little reason to think that any
of these goals will be advanced by judicial reform projects or strengthening
the rule of law. Law within a given society may cut against any, or all of,
these goals; nor should one assume that judges will be sympathetic to their
advancement. Far-reaching economic, political, and cultural transforma-
tions must occur in these countries for this progressive plank to become a
reality. These goals can be better advanced if activists work directly on
behalf of each objective rather than pinning their hopes on the magical
power of the rule of law (opportunists who cloak their agenda under the
rule of law mantle already act on this recognition).
Let us assume, finally, that the goal is to provide the populace with
effective dispute resolution fora. That is often thought to be the essential
role of courts. Recall, however, that even in the West, private arbitration or
mediation handle a substantial proportion of disputes. In many develop-
ing contexts, courts and law are deeply problematic for all the reasons
described earlier. It might make sense, therefore, to invest resources in
existing alternatives or to create new community tribunals where none
exist. More than 80% of people in developing countries already take their
disputes to non-state tribunals, so supporting such alternatives will merely
be catching up to reality. In response to these actions, state legal institu-
tions faced with a potential rival for resources and prestige might even be
prompted to improve their functioning, or state and non-state tribunals
might, over time, merge or interact in a complementary fashion.
The penchant of many legally trained development practitioners and
academics to assume that state law and state courts are the solution to the
problems faced by these countries is the product of ingrained beliefs about
the state having a monopoly over law. In situations where the state legal
system fails to deliver basic services and attempts to reform the system
persistently fail, the solution must be found elsewhere. Just as functional
alternatives to law may satisfy the requirements of economic development,
functional alternatives to law may be available to resolve disputes, maintain
order, and coordinate behavior. Customs and customary law; religious
norms and bodies; and community or informal norms and tribunals do a
great deal of this work in many settings around the world.20 4 The pride of
place that law jealously claims should not be a bar to finding workable
solutions to social problems, even if that means stepping around existing
state legal institutions.
The latest wave of law and development work has already turned to
explore social alternatives to law.20 5 This too is not a panacea, it must be
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said. Some of these alternatives will be corrupt or oppressive, will be con-
trolled by local power holders, will impose draconian punishments, or will
enforce cultural or religious inequalities (caste systems, and denigration of
women).20 6 With these large caveats, non-state alternatives that function
in ways that meet the needs and values of the community can provide an
essential service to people who are now ill-served by state legal systems.
These comments draw out once again why "law and development" is
misleading: the very label suggests that law, or the "rule of law," has a
special ability to deliver desired development goals. That faith is bound to
disappoint. Law cannot deliver in and of itself because it swims in the
social sea with everything else.
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